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Introduction 
Globalization Comes to Mexico's Peasantry 
During the term of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Mexico 
retreated from its traditional economic policy of import substitution-protection 
of national industries and heavy and broad investment in state and parastatal 
enterprises. By the beginning of the sexenio (six-year term) of Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (1988-1994) the country was moving rapidly to liberalize its economy. 
By the time the United States and Mexico ratified the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, the Mexican government had sold off much 
(though not all) of its interest in productive industries (it still owns nationalized 
electrical and oil industries), vastly curtailed its intervention in the banking and 
communication sectors, and agreed to phase out its deep involvement in agricul-
tural production. 
As profound as these changes were to the Mexican economy, however, an 
enormous impediment to a truly "free" economy remained. Mexico's sector 
social, the vast network of ejidos and comunidades (cooperatively/communally-
owned lands1) overseen by an immense government bureaucracy, remained as an 
impediment to free trade, for lands in the sector could not legally be bought, sold, 
or leased. Mexican leaders understood that for neoliberal policies of free trade and 
open markets to seduce investors into viewing Mexico as a place with potential 
for profits in real estate or agricultural enterprises, something had to be done about 
this, the nation's quasi-socialist component: collective ownership affected nearly 
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230 million acres-one-third of Mexico's land (and one-half its arable land). 
Mexico had to be willing to make a good faith show of shedding its collectivist 
agrarian past in order to reap the purported benefits of the unrestricted flow of 
goods and currency across its borders. A country where land is not in one way or 
another up for grabs can hardly be a full player in the global marketplace. 
In this essay I will discuss briefly the effect of the neoliberal reforms on 
Mexico's ejidos, the lands held in trust by the government for the country's more 
than three million ejidatarios. As Mexico's leaders became cheerleaders for 
globalization, how did their new policies affect the status of the peasantry? Are 
peasants in the process of becoming free yeomen? Are ejidos becoming more 
flexible in offering opportunities to outside investors? These are questions that 
need to be answered to determine the extent that neoliberal policies and the forces 
of globalization have penetrated Mexico's hinterland. 
I have chosen several ejidos in the northwestern Mexican state of Sonora as 
a case study of the effects of this truly massive political change on the lives of real 
people.2 
The Setting: Ejidos and Land Reform 
In 1992 President Salinas announced constitutional amendments reforming 
Mexico's vast system of ejidos. He also announced the formation of a large 
federal bureaucracy, Procède,3 operating out of the Ministry of Land Reform 
(Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria), to oversee the reforms. These historic 
changes heralded sweeping alterations in Mexico's land tenure, the most compre-
hensive since the adoption of the Constitution of 1917. The Salinas administra-
tion touted the amendments as reform of an obsolete, corruption-ridden, and 
inefficient system. In reality, however, they constituted attempts to bring the 
sector social, the vast social and agrarian welfare bureaucracy and its clientele, 
into line with the neoliberal reforms taking place throughout the government and 
private sectors. To put it more crassly, they constituted a Mexican attempt to 
convince U.S. and Canadian negotiators for the NAFTA that Mexico was 
ideologically sincere in wanting to become a partner in free trade, and would 
begin to cleanse itself of institutions incompatible with the free market. 
The urge to privatize that obsessed Mexico's new neoliberal technocrats and 
ideologues went beyond Mexico's state and parastatal production units. These 
had been undergoing transfer to private ownership since the presidency of de la 
Madrid. The newfound infatuation with privatization and the market economy 
extended to what had heretofore been considered sanctified and untouchable 
terrain-the distribution of land to the peasantry that had been the rallying cry for 
the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the tenure of those lands that had been 
distributed under the resulting programs. 
My Sonoran colleague, ecologist Alberto Burquez, and I had been conduct-
ing socio/ecological studies throughout Sonora for several years when we quite 
accidentally happened in 1996 onto the east central Sonoran ejido community of 
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Tecoripa, which was facing upheavals produced by the new reforms. The abrupt 
changes (some would characterize them as traumas) facing the villagers left few 
other topics for conversation. For the next two years we followed the changes in 
and published our findings (Yetman & Burquez 1998). Since then we individu-
ally or together have visited more than a dozen ejido-based villages to ascertain 
the changes in social structure and land tenure brought around by the ejido reform. 
Quite specifically, I have attempted to ascertain the degree to which newly 
privatized lots are being bought and sold as one might expect private property to 
be. I hoped to see to what extent the fears of opponents and the hopes of 
proponents of ejido reform were coming true. If Mexico has truly adopted a 
market-driven economy, to what extent has the market penetrated the formerly 
socialist or collectivist part of Mexico's economy? If the ejido reforms were 
driven by Salinas's push to propel Mexico into the global economy, to what extent 
would this effort show up as market activity in the social sector? My findings are 
based on necessarily cursory research. My data is ethnographic, even anecdotal. 
More rigorous studies will provide a clearer picture of the changes taking place 
in rural Mexico. 
Most Mexican presidents before Salinas had shown disdain for ejidos, even 
going so far as to condone the assassination of populist peasant leaders.4 None, 
however, had dared suggest wholesale re-conceptualization of the ejido system, 
that most noteworthy and peculiarly Mexican institution. Indeed, through the 
mid-1980s presidents would announce the formation of yet another ejido or two 
on lands seized from various blackguards. Salinas, however, undoubtedly viewed 
privatization of the social sector as necessary to demonstrate to the United States 
Mexico's (and his) ideological and political commitment to free trade, hoping 
thus to influence U. S. politicians in the debate over the Tratado de Libre 
Comercio (Treaty of Free Trade) as NAFTA is known in Mexico. Previous 
presidents (Echeverria [1970-1976] and de la Madrid [1982-1988]) had carried 
out important reforms for ejidos, loosening the restrictions on agricultural credit, 
offering crop insurance, and permitting within ejidos the creation of civil 
societies (corporations) that could legally contract with outsiders for the use of 
ejido lands. But none had dared attack the institution of the ejido as such. Their 
gestures were intended to modernize ejidos, not to shove them into a capitalist 
economy. 
Privatization of everything was for Harvard-trained Salinas as much a credo 
as it was for Bill Clinton, so the presence of such enormous acreage dedicated to 
collectivist ideology in a nation supposedly committed to free trade constituted 
an embarrassment to a gradually privatizing Mexico.5 Neoliberal and conserva-
tive Mexicans alike viewed ejidos as shackles. Neoliberals saw them as a 
hindrance to the opening of all of Mexico to the free flow of international capital 
and investment in productive resources. Conservatives saw them as wasting 
precious terrain on a mass of ignorant collectivists.6 Noting the general movement 
toward rationalizing ejido lands, Mexican cynics sniped that there were profits to 
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be had in privatizing the social sector just as there had been in selling off the public 
sector, as Salinas's brother Raul, now incarcerated, found to his immense but 
temporary financial advantage. 
In addition, but more quietly, neoliberals noted that small producers tended 
toward an inefficient subsistence form of production, raising crops and running 
cows for their own needs, not primarily for the market (Cornelius and Myhre 
1998, 6). If millions of Mexican peasants remained outside the cash economy, 
Mexico's global attractiveness to foreign retailers would be diminished. Foreign 
investors in an economy require cash customers.7 
Ejidos in Mexico, 1917-1992 
While the Mexican revolution of 1910 failed to alter the class structure of the 
nation, it did offer major land reform through the creation of ejidos and with them, 
the social sector. The agrarian revolution in Mexico's south led by Emiliano 
Zapata was fueled by the failure of the Mexican government to recognize and 
legitimize ancient communal landholdings. Restitution of communal lands 
seized from peasants by landlords became the principal tenet of Zapata's Plan de 
Ayala (see Womack 1970). In the constitutional deliberations of 1917 Zapatistas 
triumphed over the disdainful objections of Mexico's wealthy and military elite 
when the agrarianist Article 27 became prominently and, its backers believed, 
permanently lodged in the Mexican Constitution.8 
Ejidos were conceived and expounded in the Constitution as parcels of land 
collectively owned and either collectively or individually worked by the official 
tenants (ejidatarios). Title to the lands was held in trust in the national Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform (SRA), but actual decisions as to the uses and ultimate 
disposition of the land were to be decided by the ejidatarios in mandatory 
monthly meetings of the ejido general assembly. Under the highly committed 
leadership of President Lâzaro Cardenas (1934-1940), who distributed far more 
land to peasants than all other Mexican presidents combined,9 the institution of 
the ejido grew to become a sacred symbol for millions of Mexicans. The dream 
of Mexican peasants of having land of their own was fulfilled only because of 
Article 27 and Cardenas, who took it seriously. By the 1990s 94 million hectares10 
(more than 230 million acres) were included in 28,000 ejidos and more than three 
million ejidatarios controlled them (Barry 1995, 12). 
The attitudes of succeeding presidents toward the social sector ranged from 
outright hostility (Miguel Alernan, 1946-1952 and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, 1964-
1970) to tepid endorsement (José Lopez Portillo, 1976-1982). Presidents and the 
ruling Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) party used a wide variety of 
tactics (short of making the sector economically viable), especially ongoing 
rhetoric, to retain the electoral support of the three million ejidatarios. For 
example, towards the end of his administration (1970-1976), President Luis 
Echeverria perceived (correctly) that his and his party's popular image had been 
deeply tarnished by his involvement in (among other things) student massacres 
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and the nearly single-handed destruction of the Mexican economy (Krauze 1998, 
739-752). To bolster his historic stature (he envisioned himself as a 1970s 
Cardenas) he proposed aggressive populist schemes for increasing ejido produc-
tivity and in Sonora expropriated large landholdings of some of his political 
enemies, turning them over to newly formed ejidos (Calderon Valdés 1985,231 ). 
It was apparent, though, that he and his party functionaries really cared only for 
the votes the social sector could deliver. Almost none of them—from the 
President to lowly bureaucrats—believed in the viability of the ejido (Looney 
1975,85) except as a repository of deliverable votes. For all his public posturing, 
Echeverria failed to produce any reforms that might have made ejidos more 
productive, efficient, and honest. During the 2000 presidential campaign, PRI 
officials handed out checks to ejidatarios as they had done for decades, warning 
that unless the ejidos voted solidly for the PRI candidates, the checks and all other 
government assistance would dry up.11 
Prior to the 1992 reforms, ejido lands could not legally be bought, sold, 
rented, or leased, a key provision in the Constitution to prevent concentration of 
land in private hands, or the re-emergence of hacendados (land barons). While 
each ejidatario could be assigned a parcel, no ejidatario could claim a parcel on 
an absentee basis. The law required that he (virtually all ejidatarios were men 
except for cases where an ejidatario died leaving only female successors) live on 
ejido lands and could be absent for extended periods of time only with permission 
of the ejido's general assembly. No ejidatario could be granted a parcel larger 
than that allocated to others or constituting more than five percent of the total land. 
Furthermore, any ejidatario who failed to work his parcel faced losing it. Lands 
not allocated as individual parcels or urban lots were to be available to all as 
commons for firewood, herbs, lumber, rock, and free-roaming livestock. 
These provisions were instituted to ensure that peasant lands would be 
inalienable, so that the phrase "land to the tiller" would be something more than 
a mere slogan. No matter how wealthy members of Mexico's ruling class might 
become, they could not (legally) buy, rent, or lease land from under a peasant's 
feet, even with a shotgun to his head. No peasant could become a stand-in for a 
fatcat land baron, nor could a class of absentee landlords arise among the social 
sector. At the same time, however, the land could not be (legally) bought and sold. 
According to liberal economics, this precluded the incorporation of land into the 
efficiencies of the market, making foreign investment in half of Mexico's 
farmland illegal. We must assume that all the protective provisions of pre-1992 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution were albatrosses around the neoliberalized 
neck of Carlos Salinas. They also help account for the determination Salinas 
exhibited to undertake something no previous president had done-attack the ejido 
system head on. 
Salinas had a rational basis for his jihad. Since public ownership also 
precluded the use of ejido lands for collateral, credit for seed, fertilizer, beasts of 
burden, and, in the case of prosperous ejidos, farm machinery, could not be 
obtained from traditional or commercial banks. Instead, it was to be arranged 
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through a nationalized ejido bank {Banco Nacional de Crédite Rural). Invested 
with enormous power, the bank became a vast dispenser of political favors and 
a virtual bottomless pit of disappearing public funds (see Myhre 1996,130-136). 
Although it was reformed on several occasions and it lumbered through a number 
of incarnations as of the late 1990s (it is now known as Banrural), the bank 
invariably lost money, often lots of it. It could hardly require collateral from 
peasants who had virtually no assets besides their corn and beans to post, and it 
was plagued with numerous cracks and holes within its structure through which 
funds vanished like fog. Throughout its existence, the bank managed to provide 
credit to only 40 percent of ejidatarios (Thiesenhusen 1996,42) and most of these 
loans were of amounts too small to be of economic benefit to the recipients. Only 
ejidatarios with solid connections to the (then) ruling PRI12 could hope to snag 
useful loans. These usually carried no penalty if repayment became inconvenient. 
Peasants came to view credit from Banrural as a right, especially when they voted 
correctly (Myhre 1998, 41). 
Thus, the Salinas reformers had ample ammunition for their reforms. They 
pointed to widespread corruption, illegal sale and renting of ejido lands, disas-
trous ecological conditions, and low productivity. Virtually every provision of 
ejido law was routinely violated. Entire ejidos existed without a single resident.13 
Ejidatarios leased out arable land with impunity.14 Furthermore, because credit 
could be obtained only through the government bank, a relationship of depen-
dence between the ejidatarios and the government evolved that had become 
unhealthy at best, critics maintained.15 
All of these criticisms of the social sector and many, many more were widely 
documented. Corruption was as widespread in and among ejidos as it was in 
Mexico itself, shades of Tammany Hall on a national scale, only worse. Ejidos 
were fraught with nepotism, favoritism, graft, and extortion.16 The corruption 
perverted the purpose of the ejidos, which was to provide productive land for the 
peasantry that would be safe from seizure by the ruling class. For example, in an 
ejido in which I was conducting research, its comisario (president) sold a prime 
street corner to a wealthy and well-connected gasoline concessionaire for 
constructing the town's only gasoline station. Although the sale was patently 
illegal, the station was built, the new "owner," a non-ejidatario, assumed "title," 
and the station continues to operate. It is widely assumed that the comisario 
pocketed the proceeds, which must have been substantial. The other ejidatarios 
declined to report the felonious transaction to authorities for fear of retaliation (or 
perhaps because they were in collusion). Often the federal authorities themselves 
were in on such deals, demanding their cut. My research and reports from 
ejidatarios and officials within the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Sonora 
indicate that this experience can reproduced to varying degrees in a majority of 
Sonora's nearly 900 ejidos. Salinas viewed privatization as a means of elimina-
ting this source of corruption. 
In the same vein, drylands (non-irrigation) ejidos tended to be allocated 
marginal lands, and because parcels were usually far below the size necessary to 
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support a family, the bulk of these lands exhibited a dismaying degree of 
ecological degradation. It was widely known, for example, that in the Mexican 
northwest one could determine the ownership of livestock pastures merely by 
looking at the range condition. If overgrazing was rampant and erosion on the 
increase, the pasture could usually be assumed to be ejido land. One could learn 
quickly to identify at a glance from the highway which lands were ejidos and 
which were privately owned. Common lands were routinely overstocked and 
textbook cases of erosion are common throughout the country.17 Furthermore, in 
Mexico's arid northwest, parcels were of such limited productivity that nearly all 
ejidatarios were forced to find separate employment apart from what their parcels 
and the common lands would yield. Interviews that Burquez and I conducted 
reveal that many older Sonoran ejidatarios worked in the United States in the 
1950s and 1960s as braceros and later as green card workers or, more commonly, 
as illegal aliens. Some of these workers would return to their lands to meet 
residency requirements. Others did not bother to return. Instead they bribed ejido 
officials or had relatives stand in for them and forge their signature at meetings.18 
For the most part these former braceros now reside permanently in their ejidos, 
but according to testimony from Sonoran ejidos, their children tend to leave the 
ejidos, not for the United States, but for the Sonoran cities of Hermosillo, Ciudad 
Obregon, and Navojoa. 
President Salinas also pointed out that one of the functions of Mexico's 
agrarian reform (and Article 27 of the Constitution) had been to distribute land to 
peasants. Now, he proclaimed, there was no more land to distribute. The peasant 
population was increasing, but no new lands were available for ejidos. Yes, there 
were private estates operating in excess of constitutional prohibitions, but these 
were not touchable by a president who extolled the virtues of private property.19 
Salinas felt compelled to assure private landowners that they would no longer be 
subject to expropriation. There would be no more Echeverrias. This assurance, he 
hoped, would encourage more investment to "modernize" Mexico's agricultural 
production.20 
In summary, the Salinas reforms led to only one conclusion: Mexico's 75-
year experiment with agrarian reform and collectivization of land had been a 
failure. Yes, the new changes would result in fewer peasants in the countryside 
and more in the cities, but this was a good thing, Salinas and his allies argued. The 
new arrivals from the countryside would be absorbed into manufacturing and 
service industries created by the wave of new investment stimulated by Mexico's 
neoliberal reforms. Or so they insisted it would be. It was a clear as anything could 
be-to the already convinced (Cornelius and Myhre 1998, 6). 
Even with the social sector's acknowledged unimpressive record of accom-
plishments, however, defenders of the ejido had rejoinders. They pointed out that 
the majority (but by no means all) ejido lands were inferior in productive potential 
to adjacent privately owned lands. Ejidos were often examples of "lemon 
socialism" in that the government would distribute worthless or nearly worthless 
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land to applicants and claim the distribution as proof of commitment to agrarian 
reform and The Revolution. Or land would be distributed but no resources for 
"developing" it made available. Ejidos were seldom the beneficiaries of the 
massive agricultural development projects sponsored by the government. The 
ejido bank was as riddled with corruption as any institution could be, so 
meaningful credit seldom reached the people who needed and deserved it. 
Furthermore, with the exception of the vigorous pro-ejido activity by 
officials of the Cardenas administration, agricultural research in Mexico was 
almost entirely directed toward the private sector. Jennings (1983) studied the 
Rockefeller Initiative, a program based in Mexico and funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation from the early 1940s through the 1960s to increase the yield of basic 
grain crops. The Initiative formulated Mexico's agricultural policy, which 
stressed capital-intensive, large-scale irrigation projects. Jenkins found that the 
Initiative was highly biased towards the owners of large tracts of privately owned 
land, who benefited overwhelmingly from Rockefeller-sponsored research. The 
social sector was deliberately excluded, and officials within the administrations 
of Presidents Avila Camacho ( 1940-1946) and Miguel Alernan ( 1946-1952) who 
objected to the model and the snubbing of the needs of smallholders were 
dismissed from their positions, apparently at the behest of Rockefeller officials. 
Jennings concludes that the Green Revolution was designed deliberately to 
undermine the economic viability of ejidos and communally owned lands while 
strengthening the economic power of large holders. Critics of ejidos shrugged off 
their nonproductive as just another proof of the failure of the social sector, not 
as a result of the government's refusal to provide ejidos with the tools necessary 
for increased production. 
Defenders of the ejido system pointed out that on the one hand, then, 
government officials withheld the necessary assistance to make ejidos viable 
while, on the other hand, assiduously trying to corrupt ejidos by offering bribes 
and other illegal payments in return for political favors, which were often 
reciprocated. Since successful and self-sufficient ejidos would not depend on 
governmental largesse, they were to be discouraged, not subsidized as private 
farms were.21 Finally, new ejidos were often formed by members selected by 
anonymous government bureaucrats from lists compiled countrywide, so the new 
associations, especially in the northwest where land tenure is often more recent, 
were often formed by strangers with no shared interests other than the desire to 
have land.22 One's new neighbors often spoke with strange accents, ate alien 
foods, and exhibited queer customs.23 
In the face of these innumerable obstacles to developing ejidos' productivity, 
defenders countered the government's (and conservative critics') attacks on the 
ejido system. Belittling ejidos, they said, was akin to assassinating peasants, then 
accusing their children of being orphans and condemning their poverty. If the 
government were to dedicate the funds and enthusiasm toward the social sector 
that it had to the private sector, the health of the social sector would be far 
different, they argued. How could the social sector be a model of productive 
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efficiency given the profound and unsettling limitations with which it was 
saddled? 
Perhaps the most thoughtful critique of ejidos lay in the observation that the 
system nurtured a relation of dependency between the ejidos and the government, 
which provided (and withheld) credit, subsidies, and legal assistance at its 
pleasure. Critics and apologists alike agreed that the ejido system had become a 
huge drain on government resources (see, for example, Gates 1993), andthatmost 
ejidos could not have survived without infusions of public money, which 
ejidatarios claimed as a right. This dependence was fostered by the ruling PRI 
party in order to retain the bloc of ejidatario voters it viewed as essential to its 
perpetuation of its political hegemony. Through the CNC (Confederation National 
de Campesinos), the government-sponsored National Peasants' Union, the gov-
ernment maintained control over ejidos and quashed dissident movements before 
they could expand (Bartra 1996,175). The party also maintained close affiliation 
with as many ejidos as possible, bestowing favors upon party loyalists and 
punishing dissidents, warning of dire consequences if any opposition party were 
to assume power in Mexico. In other words, the PRI needed dependent ejidos to 
guarantee its electoral domination. During voting, PRI goons would frequently 
watch peasants as they voted, to ascertain that the ejidatarios made correct 
notations on their ballots.24 
Few, then, would dispute that Mexico's social sector was desperately in need 
of reform. But was Salinas's solution the right one? American negotiators for 
NAFTA were aware of the structural pitfalls of the social sector, as the abundant 
literature on ejidos, some cited in this essay, demonstrate. They surely maintained 
that public money invested in a socialist enterprise would not reap profits for 
individual investors. The ejidos were an obstacle to free trade. Cornelius and 
Myhre (1998,5) cite then Mexican Undersecretary of Agriculture Luis Téllez as 
saying, " . . . we must have institutions that are compatible with free markets. . . . 
There is a need for well-defined property rights, enforceable through the judicial 
system. The lack of such security has hindered agricultural investment in 
Mexico." Such unabashedly neoliberal sentiments have a decidedly un-Mexican 
ring. Téllez referred not only to assurance that large holdings would not be 
expropriated by some populist politicians but also to the security of owning land 
free of ideological and political encumbrances, that is to say, free of ejido 
complications. Until a land developer could make an offer with the hope of 
acceptance on ejido land to build a new subdivision or a foreign investor could 
willy-nilly contract for a field of exportable cantaloupes, Mexico did not have a 
system of free markets. 
Salinas's program of privatization was to have been completed by 1994, the 
end of his sexenio. We can only assume that he envisioned a couple of million 
proud new landowners brandishing their scrolled land titles heavenward in praise 
of the outgoing president. He did not figure he would wind up banished and 
seeking refuge in Ireland and Cuba, a pariah in his own country.25 By the year 
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2000, precious few ejidatarios had achieved full ownership of their parcels, not 
because it was not possible, but because they were apparently not motivated to do 
so.26 Mexico's peasants appeared to be balking at assuming the role of full-
fledged capitalists. 
Privatization 
In spite of spirited opposition, primarily from left-wing groups and intellec-
tuals, Salinas pushed his reforms through a mostly pliant congress. To undertake 
the truly massive task of restructuring the nation's ejidos, a bureaucracy was 
established within the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to oversee the transition of 
ejido land from the social sector to (it was hoped) private hands. Each ejido was 
to be given the choice whether or not to privatize. 
The privatization program, called Procède, required each ejido to vote to 
privatize or to reject privatization. Safeguards were incorporated to guarantee that 
the vote was legitimate and that a genuine majority view was expressed. With a 
vote in favor of privatization, the government would provide free of charge an 
official land survey of ejido and parcel boundaries (Gômez Carpinteiro 1998).27 
After ejidatarios fulfilled a series of legal requirements, they would take a second 
vote. Once this was accomplished and approved and the land survey completed, 
they could receive individual certificates for their lands. They then had the right 
to sell or rent their parcels to other ejidatarios, residents of the ejido, or certain 
corporations, and to pay taxes on them. Arms-length sales to non-ejido individu-
als, however, could only take place if the ejidatario received papers of dominio 
pleno (full ownership), and this was possible only with the concurrence of the 
ejidatarios' successors and the adjacent ejidatarios and approval of the general 
assembly of the ejido}* This provision of ejido reform-requiring an additional 
step from receiving a parcel certificate to receiving full title—was instituted to 
address the concerns of critics that full ownership of parcels would lead to rapid 
buying of tjidos by outsiders and, by implication, North Americans. To date, very 
few Sonoran ejidatarios have applied for full ownership (Procuraduria Agraria 
2000, personal communication.) 
Local administration of Procède became the responsibility of a corps of 
bureaucrats, for the most part young technocrats schooled in neoliberal econom-
ics, and hence supporters of privatization with varying degrees of enthusiasm. I 
found the agents to be for the most part eager, honest, well-trained, and well-
intentioned, but perhaps not prepared for the variety of responses they encoun-
tered when presenting their case to the ejidos.29 Their presence (impending or 
actual) invariably caused a flurry of activity within the ejidos-of boundary checks 
(and, in some instances, sneaking fences), re-creations and re-inventions of 
history, recent and ancient, and family discussions and arguments. In Ejido 
Tecoripa new fences popped up maze-like in advance of Procède as socios (as 
ejido members are often called) frantically marked off their claims in advance of 
the new land deal. 
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Promoters of the ejido reform and the techno/bureaucrats charged with 
selling the program to ejidos spoke optimistically of increased productivity as 
individuals became responsible for their own lands and were able to obtain credit 
using their parcels as collateral.30 With varying degrees of articulation these tech 
reps promoted reform to the ejidatarios, usually in meetings outside under a 
ramada or in an open field.31 They envisioned an emerging class of rural yeomen 
motivated by profit providing better husbandry to the land and developing rural 
resources according to market needs. They pointed out that privatization would 
increase the local tax base.32 They viewed merging parcels into larger ones as an 
efficient move that would permit economies of scale to increase productivity, 
whether through grazing or through crops, or any other enterprise that would 
bring about the highest possible return. Although their vision was thin on real-
world case studies, their neoliberal instincts took the place of empirical data and 
gave them inspiration.33 
Other critics of Procède see the process as intimidating to and a virtual 
blackmail of the peasant who hopes to arrange credit and receive farm subsidy 
payments (Perez Castafieda 1998, 58; Baitenmann 1998, 112). Consciously or 
unconsciously, the Procède officials also successfully played on deep-seated 
resentments nearly universal in ejidos where many socios complained that they 
worked on common lands only to see some slackers and drunkards sharing in the 
benefits when they did nothing to earn them. 
Skeptics within and without ejidos warned that in the wake of Procède sales 
would begin to concentrate parcels in fewer and fewer hands (a charge proponents 
welcomed) and a new rural oligarchy would emerge, creating once again a vast 
landless proletariat in Mexico's hinterlands.34 They foresaw outsiders buying up 
ejido lands, using various stratagems to gain control of entire ejidos. They 
fulminated that the new privatization, combined with Mexico's new policy 
inviting foreign investment, would re-create the conditions of \ht porfiriato (the 
dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz 1880-1910) and produce a new generation of 
hacendados (see, for example Harvey 1996; Rubio 1996; Toledo 1996).35 One 
hundred years earlier, those conditions-welcoming foreign investment and 
ownership of lands, disciplining the work force with an iron hand, and lodging 
political power in the hands of a small number of landowning elites-created such 
vast social discrepancies that the Mexican Revolution became virtually inevi-
table.36 The critics contended that the changes to Article 27 would initiate a return 
to those same conditions. They warned, moreover, that dispossessed ejidatarios 
would swell the ranks of illegal migration to the United States. 
Lingering in the recesses of the critics' minds, as several have explained to 
me, is fear that foreigners, especially investors from the United States, will grab 
land parcels and gradually (insidiously, from the Mexican perspective) come to 
control Mexican territory and, through it, Mexico. Their fears are not groundless, 
for during the porfiriato North American capital made a shambles of Mexican 
sovereignty (Ruiz 1988F).37 And the history of the secession of Texas still grates 
on Mexican's patriotic instincts. 
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Procède lagged far behind the initial optimistic schedule for completing 
privatization by 1994. By May 1995, only roughly a third of Sonora's nearly 900 
ejidos3S had completed the Procède process (Martinez Rascôn 1998,185). Nearly 
all ejidos were receptive to the reforms, especially those in Sonora and other states 
of the north. Historic ties to the land were more tenuous there than in ejidos of the 
south where ejidatarios lived on lands tilled by many generations of then-
ancestors. Many Sonoran ejidatarios with whom I spoke (in more than a dozen 
ejidos) found the idea of personal (as opposed to community) ownership attrac-
tive. Yet the complexity of the proceedings led to numerous complications and 
delays. In the ejido Tecoripa, for example, what appeared to have been a simple 
question posed to the ejidatarios, i.e., Do you favor privatizing your parcels?, 
became inextricably mixed up with the internal question, Do you wish to expand 
the size of your parcel prior to the privatization? The controversy surrounding the 
latter question (see Yetman and Burquez 1998) delayed the final vote on Procède 
for at least a year. In Tecoripa it was clear that as Baitenmann (1998) found in 
Oaxaca, few ejidatarios understood Procède. She found, as did we, that confusion 
on the details of the reform was to be found among Procède officials as well. 
There were other systemic blockages. The supply of trained technocrats 
lagged far behind their ability to administer the program to 28,000 ejidos. The 
burden of conducting thousands of land surveys simultaneously fell upon the 
national department INEGI, which lacked trained land surveyors and could 
hardly anticipate the complexities of surveying every parcel in each ejido (some 
4.6 million parcels and 4.3 million urban lots! [Perez Castaneda 1998]), espe-
cially in a system where internal disputes over boundaries were legion.39 The 
rebels in Chiapas in late 1994 castigated the ejido reform as a prime example of 
the government's sellout to the rich at the expense of the poor. The Zapatistas' 
pronouncements caused many southern ejidos to hesitate about implementing the 
reforms and many ejidos in Chiapas denied entry to Procède officials. In the north, 
some ejidos were located in isolated mountain terrain hours from the nearest 
highway, making the required series of meetings and the engineering surveys 
cumbersome for government officials. Although the government had envisioned 
a rapid completion of Procède, as of late 1999, the crew responsible for overseeing 
the presentation to ejidos had not yet arrived at an ejido I visited in a remote 
section of the Sierra Madre Occidental in Chihuahua. This is not surprising, given 
the enormity of the undertaking: surveying, documenting, and providing legal 
proof of ownership to one-third of Mexico's land.40 
In the Wake of Procède in Sonora 
In 1995 the respected national newspaper La Jornada reported the claim of 
Procède officials that privatization nationwide had not yet led to the sale of the 
newly privatized plots (Ibarra Mendfvil 1996,60). The much-feared takeover of 
ejido lands was not occurring, they claimed.41 Data I have gathered in Sonora 
indicate otherwise. By the year 2000 nearly all ejidos in Sonora have voted to 
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approve Procède and have privatized or are in the process of privatizing, that is, 
nearly all have or will soon have certificates granting them ownership of their 
parcels. I have uncovered no evidence of strong-arm tactics or deceptive practices 
by Procède administrators, even though they appeared strongly to favor 
privatization. To date, few ejidatarios have received dominio pleno (clear title) 
to their lands, for it requires an additional series of steps to obtain. Sales (many 
of them illegal, since the necessary papers have not been transmitted) have been 
proceeding briskly nonetheless. A survey of ejidos in the central and southern 
portions of Sonora indicate a clear trend toward concentration as poorer ejidatarios 
sell their parcels to wealthier ones. 
In the eight Sonoran ejidos I surveyed for this study between late 1998 and 
spring 2000, all reported sales among socios (members), and six reported sales to 
outsiders. In most cases the sales appear to be hardly sufficient to provoke much 
ideological interest. For example, in Ejido Benito Juarez, an ejido ganadero 
(ranching ejido)42 in southern Sonora created in the 1970s with vague promises 
of future irrigation water, 50 of 177 socios have sold their parcels, but only 5 of 
these were sales to outsiders (all illegal). Each ejidatario was allocated 20 
hectares, roughly enough to raise two cows. The buyers appear to be wealthier 
ejidatarios who have sufficient cash or income to cough up the 25,000-35,000 
pesos ($3,000-4,000 U.S.) to buy out their neighbor's interest.43 The ejido also 
contains roughly 500 ha of common land, which is in the process of being divided 
among the remaining ejidatarios. Those who sell are usually poorer and less 
influential ejidatarios who, not unexpectedly, also were allocated only margin-
ally useful parcels. Usually the sellers owned no livestock and felt they had no 
need for land. One of these indicated that he will also sell whatever land 
constitutes his share of the remaining common lands when they are divided. Even 
so, it will be necessary to assemble a lot of parcels to produce a working ranch. 
In a decade or so, a bone fide ranch might emerge, but there are presently no land 
barons on the horizon around Benito Juarez. 
Many of the grazing portions of nearby Ejido Francisco Sarabia (some 
portions are reserved for irrigated farming) have been purchased (illegally) by a 
wealthy outsider from a nearby village apparently intent on building a small cattle 
empire and being in a position to snatch up irrigation canal rights should irrigation 
water arrive at the ejido. Prices are considerably higher than in Ejido Benito 
Juarez, apparently driven up by speculation around the rumored (but highly 
doubtful) arrival of irrigation water from the south. 
Although the buyer is considered rich by ejidatarios of Francisco Sarabia, his 
200 or so assembled hectares hardly make him a land baron. It will enable him to 
sustain a herd of perhaps 30 cows. Under ideal conditions these 30 will gross 
somewhere around $10,000-$ 12,000 annual income. A parcel and herd of that 
size wouldn't be considered worth owning in, say, Texas, where with that income 
the rancher would be eligible for food stamps. 
In Ejido San Bernardo, another ejido ganadero some 70 miles to the north, 
sales have taken place, but only internally. The buyers are residents with long-
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term reputations as more affluent and influential in local matters. The sellers tend 
to be those with reputations as low lifes, drunkards, and ne'er-do-wells. The sales 
represent what most social observers would consider a preliminary shakeout. The 
real jockeying for hacendado status is not even at the conscious level yet. Some 
of the sales are illegal, since not all socios have received their certificates of 
possession. Still, community social pressure will undoubtedly serve to enforce 
the premature sales agreements once the formalities of privatization have been 
completed.44 
Numerous sales have also taken place in Ejido Tecoripa, an ejido ganadero 
some 200 miles northwest of the southern ejido s. Most of these transactions have 
been internal, with socios seeking to expand their holdings beyond the 27 ha. 
allocated to each. Predictions that Burquez and I made in 1998 that Procède would 
lead to consolidation among some ejidatarios and a vast proliferation of fences, 
have been borne out (Yetman and Bùrquez 1998). In that community, a nascent 
class structure appears to be coalescing as a result of privatization, a phenomenon 
previously obscured by the enforced paper equality of the inalienable pre-1992 
ejido lands. 
Sales in ejido s agricolas are more complex. Prices for ejido parcels eligible 
for irrigation are substantially higher than those dedicated to pasture, for which 
raising crops is practically impossible. (In the southern coastal areas where most 
of the ejidos mentioned in this article are located, rainfall is around 350 mm [14 
inches] per year, insufficient for rainfed crops, for which roughly 500 mm is 
minimally essential.) Ejidatarios from Ejido Manuel Caudillo own rights to 5 
hectares of irrigated land each, with the promise of an additional 10 ha. of irrigable 
land if and when irrigation water becomes available.45 Some ejidatarios (fewer 
than 10 percent in early 2000) have sold their parcels for an average of about 
200,000 pesos ($25,000 U.S.) per parcel, or roughly $2,000 U.S. per acre.46 Once 
again, sales have been within the ejido. While most of the ejidatarios of Manuel 
Caudillo lease out their lands to commercial agricultural interests, it appears that 
socios are for the present unwilling to sell their parcels outright. They prefer 
instead to continue to lease them or, in a very few cases, work them themselves. 
With adequate credit, machinery, and management, these parcels can be profit-
able indeed.47 This sort of leasing, though, defeats the purpose of the creation of 
ejidos, which were a response to the rallying cry of the revolution, "Land to the 
tiller." Privatization only legitimizes a practice that made a sham of Article 27 in 
the first place. 
Data from my interviews and reports from ejidos in the region show that 
leasing and renting of parcels with irrigation rights have increased now that the 
practice is legal. It may be that the ejidatarios initially are renting out their parcels 
in the hope that they may one day be able to work them themselves. A local 
newspaper reports that 
Some are opting to rent their parcels, hoping to pay off their 
debts to Bannirai. Meanwhile they have other jobs and are 
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awaiting a new planting season and hoping that the bank will 
extend them credit. Those who sell their parcels do so to seek 
work and a better way of life elsewhere. Most of the ejidatarios 
hope for a change in government agricultural policy that will 
make farming their parcel profitable. But for now the costs of 
production and the commodity prices are so distant that profits 
are impossible. ("Ejido No Desaparecerâ, Pesé a Rentismo 
2000." Translation mine.) 
From these preliminary findings we may conclude that at least in Mexico's 
north, the feared concentration of landholdings by outsiders has yet to pose a 
major threat to lands once held by ejidos. Assembling of parcels and concentra-
tion among fewer hands within ejidos is a different story, however, and appears 
to be a common occurrence. In many cases (the exact number is impossible to 
determine because of the absence of required public reporting) the sales are 
illegal, or, perhaps extra-legal, since the requisite paper work for binding sales 
does not exist. In Ejido Tecoripa we discovered that sales took place even prior 
to the approval of Procède by the ejido. Apparently internal social pressure is 
sufficient to guarantee the permanence of the sale in the absence of official 
documents. In the near future proper documents will assure the legality of these 
sales. 
Is there any evidence that the emerging larger parcels will result in better land 
management, as apologists for ejido reform had foreseen? I have found no 
evidence that management will differ in any detail. Placing responsibility on 
individuals rather than the community has not transformed management objec-
tives. The goal of the new buyers of parcels from ranching ejidos is the same as 
that of the previous owners: to run the maximum number of cattle on a parcel, to 
see that every edible snippet of greenery is converted into livestock feed. Indeed, 
the privatization in Tecoripa has seen a bewildering proliferation of fences as 
former common lands become private property. The same appears to be true in 
Ejido Benito Juarez. The new strands of wire make easy passage through former 
common lands nearly impossible without endless opening and closing of gates.48 
This may sound unimportant to those who live in cities, but for cowboys who must 
drive cattle to water twice a day through a series of gates that must be opened and 
closed, it is a dreary complication of an already difficult way of life. As an old 
Mexican saying goes, "Cuando vino alambre, vino el hambre" (When barbed 
wire came, hunger came with it). In the case of Tecoripa, the ecological state of 
the ejido will probably be worse with privatization than prior to it. 
Discussion 
The evolution of land tenure under the revised Article 27 (i.e., the velocity 
at which land concentrates in fewer hands and a rural class society emerges) 
involves several variables in addition to cash available for transactions. These 
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include parcel topography, soil quality, local rainfall, the presence or lack of 
infrastructure such as irrigation canals, roads, and wells, the amount and extent 
of government subsidies, intra- and inter-familial social connections, commodity 
prices, and favoritism, to name a few.49 Ideological factors may be operating as 
well, but ideology decreases in ardor the closer one gets to the ground. What really 
matters to potential buyers of parcels is how acquisition of another ejidatario's 
parcel would fit into individual expansion plans, not whether it was good for the 
ejido or done in the spirit of free enterprise or personal responsibility. Alberto 
Burquez and I discovered in Tecoripa that once the commitment to privatization 
had been endorsed by the ejido membership, changes in personal ideology could 
occur quickly. Some of the strongest proponents of the previous ejido system and 
opponents of the so-called reform were quick to capitalize on opportunities to 
expand their personal holdings if they could conjure up the resources so to do. 
They were akin to many liberal Americans who found investing in the stock 
market distasteful until they succumbed to the lure of quick profits and became 
operators in the system. I speculate that this ideological flexibility will be 
different in ejidos in southern and central Mexico, where ejidatarios share 
centuries of ancestral occupation of ejido lands. Long-held attitudes toward land 
tenancy resist quick modification by profit margins. This may explain the 
reluctance to sell newly documented parcels by ejidatarios in a traditional 
community in Puebla (Gomez Carpinteiro 1998,128). To gain an accurate picture 
of land sales and draw conclusions, it will be necessary to monitor sales 
throughout the Republic for the next decade or so. 
It may be that outsiders hoping to acquire larger holdings have sampled the 
land acquisition opportunities within ranching ejidos and have found the avail-
able parcels too small or too limited in access to be worth acquiring. A twenty-
hectare parcel of eroded and overgrazed land far from infrastructure and without 
water is hardly a juicy plum for either speculator or empire-builder. A cadre of 
potential purchasers may be lurking, awaiting sufficient concentration of parcels 
within ejidos to make purchase of larger parcels practicable. One ejidatario with 
whom I spoke has joined his parcel with those of two of his sons, and has acquired 
two more, giving him a total of more than 100 ha., much of it adjoining and 
relatively well-watered. If his acquisitions continue, his parcel may attract the 
notice of potential extm-ejido buyers. We will have to wait a good while before 
any trend in this direction is detectable, however. If sales begin to occur in 
significant numbers, they will constitute a vindication of the worst fears of 
opponents of the new land reform. It is what neoliberals hope for and what 
agrarianists dread. 
What has become of ejidatarios who sold their parcels? Did they leave the 
ejido and move to cities? Did they become apart of the thousands seeking illegally 
to cross the border into the United States? Consider, for example Massey's terse 
summary of the dynamics of immigration: 
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In the context of a globalizing economy, the entry of markets 
and capital-intensive production technologies into peripheral 
regions disrupts existing social and economic arrangements 
and brings about the displacement of people from customary 
livelihoods, creating a mobile population of workers who 
actively search for new ways of earning income, managing 
risk, and acquiring capital. In the short run, international 
migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, 
but from development itself. (Massey 1999, 304) 
While Massey's analysis sums up the dynamics of migration in parts of 
Mexico, I have no reason to believe that sales of ejido lands in Sonora have 
affected ejidatarios sufficiently to induce a new cycle of migration (Procuraduria 
Agraria 2000, personal communication). Interviews I have conducted in ejidos 
show that some ejidatarios already work in the United States, with or without 
papers, so if they were to sell their parcels, sales would have no effect on numbers 
of immigrants. Many Sonoran ejidatarios work seasonally outside the ejido, so 
if they were to leave permanently, their demographic effect would also be 
difficult to determine. It is probably too early to decide if privatization will result 
in greater pressure on former ejidatarios to migrate from the ejido. If ejidatarios 
obtain full title for their parcels in greater numbers, it may signal a desire to sell 
to outsiders. 
Still, my findings in Sonora indicate that displaced or unemployed rural 
Sonorans tend to migrate to Sonoran cities rather than directly to the United 
States. This trend probably dates to the 1950s when the potential drain on the 
Sonoran workforce by the Bracero Program (1942-1964) became so severe that 
in 1955 the Sonoran government proposed to make it illegal for Sonorans to work 
as braceros.50 They established a compromise policy that to qualify to be 
braceros, Sonoran workers had to work a specified period of time as day laborers 
in Sonora. In so doing, Sonoran villagers may have developed regional relations 
with villages in labor-short areas in the more prosperous western portion of the 
state. In 1957, in spite of its common border with Arizona, Sonora did not rank 
among the top eight states contributing to the immigrant pool (Garcia y Griego 
1989).51 Given this history and the patterns the peculiarly Sonoran policy may 
have established, a Sonoran case study may not constitute a representative sample 
of national trends in migration. 
Some analysts believe that the ejido reforms of 1992 were carried out with 
the assumption (never stated in public) that illegal migration to the United States 
would act as a safety valve for displaced ejidatarios, whose numbers were 
expected to be significant (Cornelius and Myhre 1998,6). Newly-elected Presi-
dent Vicente Fox has indicated the he will support migration to the United States, 
apparently overtly (as opposed to the covert support from the PRI). Fox appears 
to be an enthusiastic supporter of free trade and of open borders as well. Mexico 
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may well become a more organized "sender society" as Massey puts it, with the 
government assisting and promoting emigration to the United States. After all, 
free trade is free trade. 
The preliminary data from my survey suggest that any increase in migration 
due to sale of ejido parcels in Sonora will occur in tiny increments, if at all. This 
matches what Cornelius (1998) found in Jalisco in 1995. Since most ejidatarios 
already have other sources of employment and the poorest ones, those most 
inclined to sell, are already marginalized, it is hard to see that internal buying and 
selling will result in abandonment of ejidos by those who have sold. If outsiders 
begin to purchase ejido parcels, this will create new dynamics and may begin to 
produce an impetus for migration, whether to the larger cities or to the United 
States. 
I hypothesized above that Salinas's primary motive in promoting privatization 
of ejidos was his adherence to the doctrines of the free market and his desire to 
remove impediments to opening markets in Mexico. For Mexico to emerge from 
its underdeveloped state its economy would have to be freed, unshackled, de-
go vernmented, neoliberalized-in a word, globalized. Ejidos, Mexico's economic 
dinosaur, would have to be drastically altered-privatized to permit the onward 
march toward a global economy. 
Has privatization of ejidos achieved this goal? The answer is, somewhat, as 
there are now many more certified parcels awaiting willing buyers and sellers 
inside the ejidos. Eight years after the ejido reforms became official, clear title to 
parcels has not been granted in numbers sufficient to provide a gauge for new 
market activity. Still, whatever the trend reveals in the coming decade, there 
seems no reason to believe that significant improvement will be made in Mexico's 
economic development as a result of the changes. The hoped-for transformation 
of production will be a long time in coming, for it is difficult to conceive how 
privatization will unleash new forces of productivity. Parcels of irrigated land 
leased illegally to commercial growers under the old regime will hardly see 
enhanced productivity merely because of a rule change. Increased sales of land 
do not generate wealth. As a friend of mine once said, you can't build an economy 
by shining each others' shoes. 
Nor is there any hint of purification under the new system. The old forms of 
corruption may have been altered, but corruption's creativity knows no bound-
aries where it is a national pastime and is usually unaffected by public or private 
ownership. The withering away of corruption hoped for by advocates of 
neoliberalism seems a chimera.52 The loss by the PRI of the 2000 presidential 
election and its decline in control of the Mexican Congress will wreak havoc with 
the traditional network of patronage within the social sector, undoubtedly 
crippling the PRI's traditional ability to offer substantial economic favors in turn 
for electoral support. Perhaps with the decline of this network a corresponding 
decline in corruption will occur. 
In notifying his nation that he was about to alter Mexico's social sector 
irrevocably, Carlos Salinas stated "The ejido will remain, but we will promote its 
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transformation" (Moguel 1998, 18). Indeed, after viewing the mixed results of 
ejido privatization, we can be certain that the social sector will hardly disappear, 
even with a strong majority of the nation's ejidos electing to privatize their 
parcels. There will remain many millions of hectares under ejido control, and 
certainly a majority of Mexico's three million ejidatarios will retain their status, 
including both those who rejected the Procède, those who accepted but decline to 
obtain clear title to their lands, and those who may have title, but still retain rights 
to common lands. The Mexican government is left with a sizeable remnant of 
collectively owned lands no less fiscally demanding than prior to the Salinas 
reforms of 1992. Unless the Fox administration chooses simply to jettison all 
public responsibility to ejidos (and their potential bloc of votes), Salinas's polite 
accommodation to the ideology of globalization may have left Mexico hardly less 
socialist than before. The still large and collectivist social sector will continue to 
constitute a public rejection of neoliberalism. Mexico's land reform struggles are 
far from over. 
Notes 
1. Ejidos are lands collectively owned by a group of individuals certified by the government. 
Comunidades are (usually) communally-owned lands of indigenous people, many of whom trace their 
occupancy to prior to the Conquest. The distinction between the two types of collective ownings is 
for the most part derived from the history of occupancy of the land. For further discussion see Yetman 
(1998). This paper will discuss ejidos only. 
2. The ejidos are located in central and southern Sonora. They are Benito Juarez, Francisco 
Serabia, Juan Escutia, Manuel Caudillo, Melchor Ocampo, San Bernardino, San José de Pimas, and 
Tecoripa. 
3. Programa de Certification de Derechos Ejidales (Program of certification of ejido rights). 
4. For example, the populist and popular Maximiliano "Machi" Lopez in Sonora in 1953. See 
Calderon Valdés (1985) V, 191. See also the charismatic Ruben Jaramillo in Morelos in 1962 at the 
instigation of President Lopez Mateos (Krauze 1998, 642). 
5. From 1946 to 1964 Mexico under presidents Miguel Alemân, Ruiz Cortines, and Adolfo 
Lôpez Matéos adhered to a policy of import substitution-including imposing high tariffs on imports 
in order to stimulate and protect national industries. While they did not object to private ownership 
of the nation's major industries, they adhered to a policy of sharp restrictions on foreign investment, 
an anathema to advocates of free trade. The attempts at destabilization of Mexico's government by 
Standard Oil during the Cardenas administration (1934-1940) were fresh in their memories. While 
they decried the populist, quasi-socialist bent of Cardenas, all felt it important politically frequently 
to raise the specter of foreign domination of Mexico's industrial economy. Beginning with the 
administration of Gustavo Diaz-Ordaz ( 1964-1970), a gradual relaxation of rigid adherence to import 
substitution set in. Miguel de la Madrid's (1982-1988) term in office saw invitations for foreign 
investors growing sweeter, while import restrictions relaxed. By the time that Salinas took office, 
Mexico was clearly on the verge of adopting free trade as its official policy. 
6. Sheridan (1988) while studying an agrarian community in northwest Sonora in the 1970s, 
heard private landowners refer to comuneros (similar to ejidatarios) as "Bolsheviks." 
7. This does not apply to maquiladoras or assembly plant productions. These operations 
should not be viewed as investments in the Mexican economy, but rather as appendages of foreign 
operations adding value by attaching Mexican labor to a product. 
8. For a description of the dynamics of this remarkable turn of events see Krauze 1997, 357-
362. Article 27 described the ejido, detailed the rights of the peasantry, defined the latifundia and 
mandated their expropriation, and placed strict limits on the amount of land individual Mexicans could 
own. 
9. Few estates were expropriated in the state of Sonora. Because of Cârdenas's delicate 
relationship with the military, he felt he dared not raise the wrath of Sonoran militarists, who were 
highly influential in the armed forces. Consequently the creation of ejidos came relatively late to 
Sonora. See Hamilton (1982) for an instructive account of how Cardenas was limited in his options 
by military threats at home and from abroad. 
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10. 1 hectare (ha.) equals 2.47 acres. 
11. During the presidential campaign of 2000, numerous reports of such vote-buying surfaced 
in Sonora, affecting several sectors with which I had contact. Myriad violations were reported around 
the Republic. Vicente Fox, the victorious candidate of the PAN (Partido de Action National) was not 
in any position to make such offers, for he lacked both an enthusiastic party mechanism for delivering 
on promises and funds to buy votes. How he will deal with the ejido sector, previously loyal to the 
PRI and hostile to the PAN (which has strong historical ties to the landed oligarchy and the Church, 
which opposed Article 27), will make for interesting viewing. 
12. Until 2000, the PRI had never lost a presidential election since its formation in the late 1920s 
and, until 1998, had never failed to enjoy a majority of Mexico's congress. 
13. A pristine but arid mountain range, the SierraBacha, paralleling the Sea of Cortés, was made 
into an ejido in the 1960s. Not a single permanent water source exists within the range and the only 
residents were transient fishermen who camped along the coast. Sierra Bacha was the first Sonoran 
ejido to privatize under Procède. The ejido rights were sold to one buyer, an entrepreneur who turned 
the range into a private bighorn sheep hunting preserve. 
14. Ejido Buaysiacobe in southern Sonora was made up of nearly 800 hectares of prime 
farmland with ample irrigation water. Each ejidatario was allocated 10 ha. Ejidatarios routinely and 
illegally leased their lands to commercial agricultural enterprises, sometimes working as day laborers 
on their own land. An ejidatario informed me that he leased to a commercial grower and spent the 
payment on beer and taxis. 
15. For excellent summaries of Bannirai's hegemony over ejidos, see Fox (1992, 92-99) and 
Myhre (1998, 39-56). 
16. Otero (1998) and Baitenmann (1998) contain different (but complementary) perspectives 
on systemic ejido corruption. 
17. Yet one author warned that ecological catastrophe, including the extinction of many rare 
and endangered species was inevitable with privatization (Perez Castaneda 1998, 66). 
18. During our research on the process of ejido privatization in Sonora, Alberto Bûrquez 
repeatedly spoke with ejidatarios who had worked illegally in the United States or who had family 
members who had worked there illegally. They also explained how other ejidatarios would sign their 
names as attending monthly meetings of the general assembly. 
19. For example, one extended family owns 1200 ha. of prime irrigated land in La Costa de 
Hermosillo Irrigation District. The Constitution limits land ownership to 100 ha. of irrigated land. 
Division of the farm among relatives makes the holdings legal. Such latifundias could be broken up 
and distributed among ejidos, with considerable popular support, but no recent Mexican president had 
the stomach for such controversy or the political storm it would create among the landed elite of 
northwest Mexico. 
20. See, for instance, the discussion of the various factions within the Salinas administration in 
Cornelius and Myhre (1998,4-10). 
21. The sad history of Sonoran ejidos who chose to remain collective or independent of the 
government is related in Calderôn Valdés (1985) V, 187-191. 
22. I spoke with a cowboy ejidatario from the state of Jalisco on his parcel in the rugged Sierra 
San Luis of northeastern Sonora. He revealed that in the 1980s he had been selected from a list to 
become an ejidatario, joining six other men and their families from various origins. None had known 
the others previously. 
23. Research that Jeff Banister, Alberto Bûrquez, and I carried out revealed that relatively few 
Sonoran ejidatarios can trace more than a couple of generation of residence on their ejidos. Many, 
especially in southern Sonora (apart from ejidos organized around Mayo villages), arrived in the last 
three decades. It is important to remember that Mexico has greater regional cultural variation than 
does the United States, with even greater regional biases. 
24. Apparently the new Federation Election Institue prevented such widespread fraud in the 
2000 presidential election. 
25. For different, but related reasons, Salinas is still widely believed to have been involved in 
the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, his chosen successor as president (his brother Raul has 
been incarcerated for his role in an unrelated murder of a public official). The catastrophic devaluation 
of late-1994 is widely attributed to Salinas's economic policies, including his promotion of NAFTA. 
Whatever the truth of these beliefs, Salinas is saddled with the public's perception of him as the author 
of misery for millions of Mexicans. 
26. According to officials of the Procuraduria Agraria in Sonora, virtually no ejidatarios in 
Sonora had received dominio pleno, that is, full private ownership of their parcel. In 1995 only 3 of 
36,7789 parcels in Oaxaca were fully titled (Stephen 1998, 126.) 
27. Gomez Carpinteiro (1998, 128-130) observed the Procède operations in an ejido agricola 
in Puebla, in south-central Mexico. He observed, as did Bûrquez and I, that if it achieved nothing else, 
Procède provided ejidatarios with an opportunity to clean up complex, tangled and sometimes 
festering issues of boundaries, debts, inheritance, obligations, and succession. 
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28. A different set of rules and regulations applied to ejidos affected by urban areas since 
distinctive conditions arose in these situations. See Jones and Ward (1998) and Martinez Rascon 
(1998). 
29. Nuijten (1995) addressed the ideology of the Procède officials and their interactions with 
ejidos and ejidatarios in rural Jalisco. 
30. Not much credit, though. The bulk of ejido parcels in the north without irrigation water had 
little market value. A 10 ha. pasture chronically overgrazed, as most are, would probably bring less 
than a thousand dollars in credit. Since agricultural chemicals, inputs, and machinery are more 
expensive in Mexico than in the United States, it is obvious that an ejidatario would not be able to 
collateralize much with his or her land. 
31. A typical ejido has 100-200 socios and only the village church has seating for more than a 
dozen or so people. Churches are generally not available for public meetings, so the meetings tend to 
be held outdoors. 
32. The actual increase in property tax revenues was minimal. In Ejido Tecoripa the average tax 
was estimated to be less than $5 U.S. (see Yetman and Burquez 1998). If all ejidatarios were to 
privatize, their combined property tax would be less than $1,000 U.S. 
33. A sustained study of the relationship of parcel size to productivity by Netting (1993) led to 
the opposite conclusion: the world's most productive farmers are smallholders. Large parcel size 
tends to be negatively correlated with productivity per unit of human labor. Earlier studies by Pimentai 
and Pimentai (1975) arrived at the same conclusion. 
34. An ejidatario in Tecoripa warned me that Procède marked the end of ejidos in Mexico. The 
government was getting out of the ejido business, he thought. He said this with some regret, but with 
a stoic acceptance. He was nota whiner. Perez Castaneda (1998:71-72) argues this point strenuously, 
but on purely theoretical grounds. He offers no figures of actual sales to bolster his contention. 
35. Mexico's Constitution, including a key provision in Article 27, specifically repudiates the 
latifundia (landed estate) by imposing acreage limitations on landowners. These proscriptions, 
however, are easily evaded by a variety of ruses and have not prevented a rural aristocracy from 
perpetuating economic and political power in rural Mexico, although surely not in the degree existing 
prior to 1917. 
36. Indeed, it was the extreme concentration of land in the hands of hacendados (owners of 
landed estates) in Mexico that gave rise to Zapata's revolution in the south of Mexico and (to a lesser 
extent) to Pancho Villa's in the north. For a detailed discussion and class analysis of the pre-
revolutionary conditions in the South see Womack (1970) 
37. Sonora's most infamous example of foreign intervention this century occurred in 1906 
when a strike broke out in the American-owned and operated mine at Cananea, Sonora. The mine 
owner, American William C. Greene, asked Sonoran governor Rafael Izâbal to order Arizona Rangers 
into Mexico to subdue the strikers. Gov. Izâbal obediently complied and the Rangers arrived in 
Cananea, sixty miles inside Mexican territory, serving as a combination of foreign troops and hired 
strikebreakers. The Rangers remained in Mexico for no more than a few hours, but their mere presence 
highlighted Mexico's loss of sovereignty in the presence of such heavy foreign influence (Almada 
1990). 
38. According to INEGI officials there are 28,058 ejidos in Mexico. These had 95,106,066 ha 
of land distributed among 3,070,906 ejidatarios. In Sonora, there are 890 ejidos that have 5,967,803 
ha of communal land, and 758,926 of individually managed land. In 1988 there were 73,711 
ejidatarios. Of these 33,775 had individual land parcels (INEGI, personal communication 2000). 
39. Many ejidos were split by disagreements over parcel boundaries. Even worse, numerous 
disagreements arose over the decades among ejidos concerning the correct boundaries of ejidos. In 
some cases violence broke out as ejidatarios from competing ejidos battled each other. See, for 
example, Greenberg (1989) and Gomez Carpinteiro (1998, 136). 
40. In addition the government (the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, SRA) simultaneously faced 
6,400 unresolved boundary questions, 2,000 applications for ejido expansions, and 3,600 judicial 
findings in favor of ejidos that had (as of 1997) not been finally dealt with. The SRA also had pending 
the adjudication of 41,000 colony lots and 575 applications claiming 14 million hectares of federal 
lands. (Perez Castaneda 1998,49-52). Given the slowness with which each of these proceedings had 
to be addressed (often official surveys were lacking and informal documents and oral testimony had 
to be painstakingly recorded), plus the millions of individual parcels to be surveyed, the task seemed 
an impossible burden for any government, much less one trying to put on a front of neoliberal 
inclinations. The army of scribes, notaries, court reporters, engineers, advocates, historians, witnesses 
and bureaucrats required simply to handle the paperwork would tax even the ancient Chinese or 
Russian systems. The volume of paper needed to complete the task would probably endanger entire 
forests. 
41. Gomez Carpinteiro ( 1998) interviewed 29 ejidatarios in an ejido in (apparently) 1995 in the 
state of Puebla after they had approved Procède and received certificates to their lots. None of them 
indicated any inclination to sell. 
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42. Ejidos are usually of two types, agricultural (the most common) and ranching (more 
common in the arid and semi-arid north and northwest). Grazing lands are worth far less than 
agricultural land. 
43. Ejidatarios who sell their parcels (certificates) retain rights to use common lands (if any) 
and their urban lot. The market value of land at Benito Juarez is currently inflated by the rumored 
arrival of water for irrigation. Were the rumors permanently scotched, the value would probably drop 
by more than fifty percent. For grazing, the land is only marginally productive. 
44. San Bernardo lies at the foot of the Sierra Madre and is a distribution center for marihuana 
and opium raised in the complex of mountains to the east and north. Local intelligence has it that no 
land sales take place in which drug traffic is not involved. We can assume that few, if any, transactions 
that take place once the ejido dropouts are out of the picture, can be considered as carried out between 
a willing buyer and willing seller (See Yetman 1995). 
45. The availability of water for irrigation is a highly politicized matter. All waters in the region 
are allocated and ground waters are rapidly being depleted, so surplus water for serving newly opened 
lands does not exist. Competing ejidos and private owners engage in frantic lobbying with the 
government officials who control the water (from Mexico's National Water Commission of Water) 
in efforts to persuade them to allocate water to their parcels rather than to others. The assassination 
of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in 1994 dealt a crippling blow to Sonoran 
irrigation interests, who assumed that as their favorite son, Sonoran Colosio would cause water to flow 
north towards Sonora from Sinaloa instead of remaining in Sinaloa where the reservoirs originate. 
Private groups also finance water conveyance systems, hoping through bribes and other chicanery to 
influence water delivery decision-makers. 
46. This compares with a market value of $6,000 per acre for irrigated land in Arizona upland 
desert valleys. The Sonoran fields are capable of 2-3 (sometimes 4) crops per year when water is 
available, compared with 1-2 in the United States (Gilliland 1999). 
47. Usually, though, the credit for machinery and inputs is unavailable, given the unwillingness 
of Mexican financial institutions to lend to small holders and the high front-end expense of initiating 
farming on irrigated land. The traditional apology for this lack of credit to the peasantry has been that 
largeholders are more likely to repay their loans. Such a rationale is suspect, given the high rate of 
bankruptcy {carteras vencidas) and outstanding loans among Sonora's agricultural elite. I visited a 
privately owned farm in Sonora's La Costa Irrigation District. It consists of more than 1,200 ha. of 
enormously productive land farmed with the latest and most sophisticated technology. The manager 
informed me that the family that owned the farm was so deeply in debt that the banks did not seize 
the farm because it would cover only a small proportion of their indebtedness. The family is also 
extraordinarily well connected politically. A Bannirai official from Ciudad Obregon informed me 
(rather proudly) that bankruptcy and foreclosure rates for Bannirai loans to small holders were lower 
than the foreclosure rates for loans to commercial operators by Sonoran commercial banks. In 1998 
Mexico experienced a crisis of its private banks, many of which threatened bankruptcy unless the 
federal government bailed them out from massive uncollectable loans. Many of these loans were to 
commercial agricultural enterprises and were issued without appropriate collateral; often they were 
"insider" loans. The government established a special agency (FOBAPROA) to bail the banks out. 
The circumstances were remarkably similar to the savings and loan debacle in the United States a 
decade earlier. So much for the myth of smaller risks by large private enterprises. 
48. Socios of Ejido Suaqui Grande in central Sonora voted to divide up all the ejido, including 
the common lands. They made provisions in the survey, however, that guaranteed more or less gate-
free access of all parcels to water on the Arroyo Suaqui. No such accommodation was considered in 
Tecoripa. 
49. My colleague Jeff Banister interviewed ejidatarios in southern Sonora on this topic in early 
2000. One mentioned that potential investors in ejido lands newly opened to agriculture had pulled 
out because of pressure from a former Sonoran governor and high PRI official who wanted the 
opportunity to go to him and his buddies instead. 
50. Historia 5:172. 
51. The top four states during that period were Guanajuato, Michoacân, Zacatecas, and Jalisco. 
Guanajuato experienced a particularly devastating drought in 1957, as did Zacatecas and Jalisco. That 
these states contributed heavily to immigration numbers to the United States, while Sonora, which had 
apparently experienced seven years of drought, did not, indicates that other factors were affecting 
Sonora's economy. 
52. Baitenmann ( 1998,116-118) found in Veracruz ejidos that far from decreasing corruption, 
Procède presented new opportunities for corruption and strengthened anti-democratic proceedings 
since it weakened the overall internal power of the general assembly. 
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